Objective: Our aim was to investigate contractual mechanisms in physician-hospital exchanges. The concepts of risksharing and the nature of physician-hospital exchanges -transactional versus relational -were studied. Methods: Two qualitative case studies were performed in Belgium. Hospital executives and physicians were interviewed to develop an in-depth understanding of contractual and relational issues that shape physician-hospital contracting in acute care hospitals. The underlying theoretical concepts of agency theory and social exchange theory were used to analyse the data. Results: Our study found that physician-hospital contracting is highly complex. The contract is far more than an economic instrument governing financial aspects. The effect of the contract on the nature of exchange -whether transactional or relational -also needs to be considered. While it can be argued that contractual governance methods are increasingly necessary to overcome the difficulties that arise from the fragmented payment framework by aligning incentives and sharing financial risk, they undermine the necessary relational governance. Relational qualities such as mutual trust and an integrative view on physician-hospital exchanges are threatened, and may be difficult to sustain, given the current fragmentary payment framework. Conclusions: Since health care policy makers are increasing the financial risk borne by health care providers, it can be argued that this also increases the need to share financial risk and to align incentives between physician and hospital. However, our study demonstrates that while economic alignment is important in determining physician-hospital contracts, the corresponding impact on working relationships should also be considered. Moreover, it is important to avoid a relationship between hospital and physician predominantly characterized by transactional exchanges thereby fostering an unhealthy us-and-them divide and mentality. Relational exchange is a valuable alternative to contractual exchange, stimulating an integrated hospital-physician relationship. Unfortunately, the fragmented payment framework characterized by unaligned incentives is perceived as an obstacle to realize effective collaboration.
Introduction
Many Western countries are struggling with rising health care expenditure. The share of gross domestic product attributed to health care continuously increases, a trend likely to intensify following the recession. 1 Combined with the large public debt that characterize public finance, many developed countries have shifted their attention away from stimulating growth of the health care delivery system, and instead focus on cost control to limit the further growth of health care expenditure. 2 Hence, health care policy makers have developed incentives for providers to utilize resources more efficiently by introducing financial risk-bearing for providers. The confluence of these forces makes it unlikely that hospitals will meet these challenges without stronger alignment of incentives and increased financial risk-sharing between physicians and hospitals. This has been described as economic integration. 3 We focus on the contractual relationships between physicians and hospitals with the objective of investigating the contracting mechanisms in physician-hospital exchanges, and the corresponding impact of governance mechanisms on the underlying hospital-physician relationships (HPRs). Governance refers to the formal and informal rules of exchange between partners. Two interdependent types of governance strategy have been developed: the transaction-based (economic contracts) and the relationship-based (relational norms). 4 Despite the changing financial context and the growing importance of the subject, few studies have investigated this. Moreover, the available studies mainly focus on joint bargaining in a managed care context 5 with virtually no research in a European context. This paper seeks to fill this gap by reporting findings from a study of physician-hospital contracting in Belgium.
Building on agency theory and social exchange theory, two comparative case studies were performed. Two hospitals were selected to include both dominant alternative principles of physician-hospital contracting. In hospital A, physicians' financial contributions to the hospital are a predetermined percentage of their fees. In contrast, hospital B uses a rigorous cost-allocation scheme and applies the principle of covering true costs. Hospital executives and physicians were interviewed to develop an in-depth understanding of the contractual and relational issues that shape physicianhospital contracting. The main contribution of the present study is to investigate the contractual mechanisms between physicians and hospitals at which they practise. On the organizational level, the study aims to provide preliminary insights into economic and non-economic aspects that guide the governance strategies of physician-hospital exchanges. Furthermore, the corresponding impact of the contractual principles on the hospital-physician working relationship is investigated. Finally, building on the insights developed, we examine how the gap between health policy goals, which focus on integrative care delivery and provider accountability, and the actual practice of physicianhospital exchanges might be bridged.
An evolving HPR
In general, physicians provide medical care and hospitals the resources to deliver that care. 6 In many countries, including Belgium, financing of secondary care is characterized by two distinct revenue streams for physicians and hospitals. Physicians act as independent, self-employed caregivers generating medical fees, while hospitals are paid to cover other operating expenses through budgets. Historically, their working relationship was described as a 'workshop model,' with both parties operating relatively independently of each other. 7 From this viewpoint, physicians see the hospital merely as the location of their work where they intervene to administer treatment to patients. They then depart, leaving most of the remaining care of the patient to the hospital. 8 However, hospital reimbursement has evolved to prospective payment systems, involving hospitals bearing financial risk for the care delivered. Specifically, in per case contracting (Diagnosis-Related Groups) hospitals receive a fixed payment per admission, retaining financial risk for the length-of-stay of patients. This change has put the workshop model under pressure, and in response physicians and hospitals have integrated economically. Contracts were developed to share the financial risk of the care between physicians and hospitals. 3 Hospital-physician exchanges shifted, to some extent, from trust-based cooperation to regulated collaborations governed by contracts between physicians and hospitals. 9
Theories of contracting
The analytical framework we use is based on two established theories of contracting: agency theory and social exchange theory. The most general description of a contract is an agreement of obligations between two or more parties. 10 The key function of a contract is to minimize uncertainty and allocate risk between contracting parties. 11 Agency theory is one of the leading perspectives in the study of contracting. It focuses on the dilemma of a 'principal' engaging another party, the 'agent', to perform a certain task or service. Agency problems arise because agents do not have identical objectives and motivations to the principal and consequently they do not necessarily act in the best interest of the principal. 12 Since our study concerns the contract between a principal (hospital) and agent (physician), we focus on the agent's opportunism and how the principal can align financial incentives to motivate the agent to perform as the principal prefers. 13 While agency theory gives insight into the complex issue of physician-hospital contracting, it has been criticized because it assumes that human motivation is primarily self-interested, ignoring the fact that economic transactions are embedded in social relationships. 14 Moreover, it fails to recognize that physicians, as professionals, have more complex motives underlying their behaviour. 15 Thus, although physicians act partly as self-interested individuals, it can be argued that they also act as public-spirited altruists. 16 Consequently, relational norms, like mutual or cooperative interchange (the reciprocity principle), which are essential for building trust and cooperation, may complement this economic approach. 4 Moreover, contracting in health care poses particular challenges due to the complexity of the services and the impossibility of drafting complete, comprehensive contracts. 17 Also, the asymmetry of information and knowledge means hospital management has a limited ability to monitor and determine the appropriateness of clinicians' decisions. 18 Finally, physician's autonomy -the freedom of a physician to deal with his or her patient and to maintain control over his or her own decisions and work activities 19 -is often safeguarded by legislation. This makes regular power structures through authorized chains of command that would be needed to achieve the alignment impossible. These four aspects highlight the importance of non-economic factors to HPRs. This argument is supported by empirical research suggesting that the quality of interaction with physicians affects hospitals' ability to contain costs and improve the bottom line. 3 In other words, influence is exercised not through command and control but through negotiation and persuasion. 20 Consequently, the focus of the current study cannot be limited to the transaction as the single unit of analysis. Therefore, our second theoretical lens concentrates on relational contracting by applying Social Exchange Theory, 21 focusing on the relationships established between hospital and physicians on the basis of transactions that occur. 22 This approach accentuates relational governance, which is defined as the strength of social norms present in the exchange, often referred to as relationalism. 23 In this view, trust-based relationships are established with the necessary room for professional discretion. 24 Relational governance can be considered as typically informal and social, compared with contractual governance. 4
Methods Setting
The present study focuses on the contractual relationship between hospital and physicians in two Begian hospitals. The two case study hospitals were selected to include both dominant alternative contracting principles (physicians' contributions to the hospitals' costs as a percentage of their professional fees and coverage of the true cost induced by their activity through a costallocation scheme present in Belgium). These overarching methods of physician cost recovery are regulated at the hospital level and apply to all physicians practising at the hospital. Both hospitals were not-for-profit organizations with a self-employed medical staff. A brief overview of Belgian hospital financing is provided in Appendix 1.
Case A was a medium-sized hospital (approximately 450 beds) that had chosen not to develop a detailed cost-allocation scheme. The contract governing the financial relationship between the hospital and the medical staff used was based on a fixed percentage of physicians' fees to cover the hospital's operational costs. The percentage due differed by specialty and type of procedure performed by the specialist. No in-depth analysis or allocation of the costs arising from medical activities was made in (re)negotiating the agreement between physician and hospital.
Case B investigated a larger hospital (approximately 900 beds) that had developed an activity-based costing system. The contract between physicians and the hospital was based mostly on covering true costs. Specifically, physicians reimburse the hospital for the direct and indirect costs arising from their activities (where not included in the hospital's budget). A rigorous costing system allocates costs to different specialists (i.e. cost drivers are identified). Because of developments in medical practice, technologies and payment frameworks, frequent negotiation takes place to refine and adapt the cost-allocation scheme.
Data collection and analysis
We conducted interviews with both physicians and members of the executive committees. Within the executive committee, the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, medical director and chief nursing officer were chosen because of the differences in their responsibilities and the differences in their interaction with medical staff. Also, because of the central role of the medical board in structured negotiations between medical staff and the executive committee, the president of the medical board was also interviewed. The different specialties were chosen based on differences in their operational connections with the hospital (e.g. the extent to which they made use of operating theatres and supporting personnel) and the differences in their remuneration and associated incentives (medical fees). We focused our study on admitting physicians and excluded supporting medical staff (like radiologists). In each hospital, we conducted an interview with a paediatrician, a geriatrician, a cardiologist, an orthopaedist and a general surgeon. All interviews were performed by the first author and lasted approximately 60 minutes.
The underlying theoretical concepts of agency theory and social exchange theory were used to code and interpret the data. Specifically, the concepts of risk-sharing and the nature of the physician-hospital exchanges (transactional versus relational) were studied.
Interview questions were open-ended and semi-structured to allow participants to address the issues which they believed to be most significant. All interviews were transcribed in full and analysis began while the data were still being collected. This allowed exploration in further detail of any items that emerged in later interviews. The transcripts were read repeatedly and the concepts derived from the theories were tested and applied to the data in order to support our interpretation of the data. Finally, the results were read by all co-authors to refine interpretation of the data. The identified codes, themes and statements are illustrated by direct quotations from the interviews. The quotes are associated with the specific interviewees using the following identification letters: case study A or B, function MD or CE and number of interviewee (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) .
Results

Contracting relationships
Economic theory states that in areas such as physicianhospital exchanges, characterized by high complexity and large asymmetry of information between the contracting parties, cooperative relationships and mutual trust are very important for successful contracting. 24 Respondents in both case studies mentioned that 'an open, constructive relationship (A-MD-3; B-CE-1)', 'transparency (A-CE-2; B-MD-5)' and 'mutual respect, communication and trust (A-MD-2; B-CE-2)' are crucial to effective cooperation, and can therefore be considered key characteristics of physician-hospital contracting. Yet, at the same time these relational qualities were under threat. Trust may be particularly difficult to sustain given the split in payment systems between physicians and hospitals and the conflicting incentives generated by the payment framework. In the words of an executive: 'hospitals bear financial responsibility for the costs of prolonged length of stay. However, physicians who admit and discharge patients are remunerated by fee-for-service and thus are not exposed to this incentive. Therefore, hospital executives face the difficult task of persuading physicians to limit length of stay (A-CE-2).' This aspect was conveyed as a 'major cause of relational tensions (B-CE-2)' between executives and physicians. Such conflicting financial incentives between physicians and hospitals were described in the interviews as a 'major obstacle to effective collaboration (B-MD-3)' and as 'undermining the needed mutual trust (B-CE-5).' Related to this, physicians reported 'understanding the viewpoint of physicians (A-MD-2)' and executives stressed the importance of 'having an eye for the interest of the other party (A-CE-3)' as prerequisites to constructive cooperation. Furthermore, comparisons between hospitals (e.g. length-of-stay) continuously 'raises the bar (A-CE-5),' making it more difficult to attain the level of performance required. One physician stated: 'I believe that lump sum payments undermine constructive HPRs. This puts hospital executives under pressure, but, at the same time, they need to respect physicians' autonomy. Of course, we should work in an integrated manner, but we have to draw the line between interactive delivery and medical decisions made between patient and physician. We [physicians] must be able to make medical choices independently (A-MD-4).'
Risk-sharing
Between hospital and physician. In general, one of the primary functions of a contract is to allocate financial risk. Specifically, the contract makes it possible to share risk between the hospital and the physician who makes the clinical decisions. Since these decisions put many other processes in motion, physicians have a considerable amount of control over hospital resources. Sharing the financial risk allows the possibility of holding physicians accountable for at least a part of the induced costs.
In case A (physician contribution as a percentage of professional fees), there is no guarantee that the total costs induced by the physician's activities will be covered, and therefore the hospital may retain a great part of the financial risk. Furthermore, this type of contribution does not directly encourage the rational use of the hospital's resources by the medical staff, which further increases the hospital's financial risk-bearing. An executive pointed out the associated effect of this on investment decisions: 'Since the fixed percentage contribution is not directly influenced by the costs induced by a given physician, a tendency to invest is more explicitly present. Physicians do not feel inhibited because they don't bear the financial consequences directly (A-CE-3).'
In contrast, in case B (the cost-allocation scheme), the physician bears the financial risk of (medical) spending not covered by the hospital's budget. In contrast to case A, this creates incentives to use medical resources rationally and in a way that limits the hospital's financial risk-bearing to a greater extent. In the words of one executive: 'Physicians bear the financial responsibility of medical investments . . . . It is their choice to determine the need, articulate specifications and evaluate the different alternatives . . . . The medical specialists concerned with that specific investment bear the induced costs and associated earnings and consequently it is their decision to make (B-CE-3).'
Among medical staff. During the interviews, the principle of sharing the costs of medical spending among all medical staff -or in words of a participant 'financial solidarity (A-MD-3)') -emerged as a third important aspect. A physician introduced this as follows: 'The medical staff is not a homogenous group. The different specialties are characterized their own nomenclature [payments] and levels of income. Also, their need for hospital-owned resources is different. Therefore, their financial relationships with the hospital differ (A-MD-1).' An increasing level of income inequity between different medical specialisms was perceived by the respondents. As a result of insufficient updating in line with the evolution of medical science and practice, fees for several procedures had gradually become historical and no longer reflected their actual cost. 25 Therefore, the non-proceduralists -physicians performing relatively little technical activity, like geriatricians -had come to earn lower incomes than the proceduralists (e.g. cardiologists). 26 Several executives (A-CE-1,3; B-CE-1-4) and physicians (A-MD-2-3; B-MD-4,5) even referred to 'excessive differences in physicians' income that cannot be accounted for.' Not surprisingly, this unfair difference in income gives rise to tensions between physicians. One physician indicated that: 'The large imbalance in the level of income damages the relationships between physicians. Since the level of the financial contribution of each physician to the hospital needs to be determined, this creates difficulties and tensions (A-MD-3).' Another physician explained that this imbalance 'is in contrast with a multidisciplinary approach and collaboration needed in modern, patientcentred health care provision (B-MD-2).' In response to this challenge of dealing with unaccounted-for differences in the input or provision costs of physicians, hospitals (in consultation with their medical staff) have included the principle of solidarity in their cost-allocation schemes. The degree to which costs are borne differs by the income level of the specialism.
In case A, the financial resources contributed by physicians are pooled at hospital level to cover all expenses related to clinical practice that are not paid for from the hospital budget. Furthermore, percentages differ according to the medical discipline and type of service. Imbalances in fee rates are partly rectified by applying different percentages.
In case B, the principle of cost allocation is applied, making it harder to correct imbalances. In contrast to case A, the contributions of physicians are not pooled at the level of the medical staff as a whole. This implies that there is less financial solidarity. However, while this is the major principle of the contract, hospital B has implemented an additional cream-skimming method to correct for the largest imbalances within the fee structure. In this system, specialists with relatively high incomes contribute a supplemental fee on top of the true cost incurred. These additional financial resources are pooled and managed at the level of the whole medical staff and are used to support medical investments, which are directly beneficial to all the medical staff (e.g. information technology).
Transactional versus relational exchange
Researchers studying both formal and informal contracts have made an important distinction between those contracts that are based on a transactional exchange and those that are based on a relational exchange. 4 However, these types should not be seen as extremes on a continuum, but coexist in a 'balanced' contract. 26 The administrative aspects of the HPR are based on transactional exchanges relating to services provided. The professional aspects of the HPR are considered to be fundamentally relational exchanges, as they emphasize loyalty, the expression of identity and altruism, rather than self-interested behavior. 27 Parallel to these findings, a difference in exchange between both cases could be identified. Moreover, in the situation where the financial agreement was characterized by a percentage-of-fee contribution, a more relational exchange based on 'mutual trust (A-MD-2)' was apparent. These physicians (A-MD-4) and executives (A-CE-2) described the financial relationship with the hospital as 'integrated', and the direct connection between the costs induced by a physician and the physician's contribution was absent. A physician noted 'I don't check how my financial contribution is spent . . . I'm confident that the hospital spends these resources properly and efficiently (A-MD-4).' The relational nature of the exchange is illustrated by this remark. In contrast, in the hospital in which physician contributions were based principally on covering the true costs, a more transactional character of exchange was apparent. Firstly, physicians were provided with a detailed explanation of the charged costs and a quid pro quo principle was applied. A physician explained 'I expect an overview of the costs ascribed to my practice. This gives me the opportunity to check if my contribution is justified (B-MD-3).' Secondly, the link between the expenditure of those financial resources that are pooled at the level of the medical staff (the creamskimming contribution) and the benefits of these investments to the medical staff was more explicitly present. A physician formulated this as follows: 'Since some medical activities and investments are not financed explicitly by the government, we [physicians] all contribute to a medical fund (B-MD-1).' This physician continued 'since the medical staff members benefit directly from these contributions, we feel this is justified. However, it is not intended to finance other [not medical] investments in the hospital or to cover other costs (B-MD-1).' Therefore, the dual character of the hospital's financial structure was clearly more pronounced in the hospital's financial management. A clear line was drawn between the expenditure of resources from the initial hospital budget and that from medical fees, which are first assigned to the physicians and then transferred to the hospital.
Discussion
Since health care policy makers are generally increasing the financial risk borne by the provider for the care delivered, it can be argued that this also increases the need to share financial risk and to align incentives between physician and hospital. 3 However, the findings of our study demonstrate -from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view -that, besides contractual governance, an alternative form of governance of physician-hospital exchanges exists. Specifically, relational governance focuses on the social norms present in the exchange. An altruistic view of the physician is applied and trust-based relationships are established with the necessary room for professional discretion.
When the interaction between contractual and relational governance is considered, two schools of thought can be distinguished in the governance literature 4 : the substitution view and the complementarity view. The latter argues that contracting issues and relational issues complement each other. Specifically, incomplete contracts are argued to facilitate the development of informal agreements and relational behavior. 28 However, while both governance strategies are, in this view, complementary, the substitution view argues that contracts are detrimental to the development of relational behavior. 29 This negative relationship between both can be explained by two arguments. First, it has been argued that drawing up a detailed contract is interpreted as a sign of distrust. 30 Second, active use of the contract may evoke opportunism, thus hindering the development of relational behavior. 29 These arguments are reflected by our findings. In the hospital where a detailed contract governed the HPR, the medical staff saw the transactional nature of the exchange as encouraging a them-and-us relationship. Also, the desire to control cost allocation and expenditure illustrated the distrust between physicians and hospital. This contrasted with the other hospital, in which physicians paid a percentage of their medical fees to the hospital. The medical staff and the executives of this hospital shared an integrated financial view of the HPR grounded in mutually trusting relationships.
Our study demonstrates that there is a tension present between the need for relational contracting, accentuating long-term collaboration and an integrative view of the HPR, and the more adversarial overall payment framework. A large majority of participants in our study felt that the present Belgian payment system, characterized by fragmentation and unaligned incentives, tended to fuel conflict, and therefore became a major obstacle to effective collaboration and undermined the mutual trust needed to build effective cooperative relationships. Integration and alignment of the hospital budget with medical fees is therefore desirable. This would decrease the need for detailed contractual arrangements and so increase the opportunity to develop relational governance mechanisms.
Furthermore, the imbalance in the income of different types of physicians should be corrected at the macro level in order to harmonize the unaccountable and thus unacceptable differences, which complicate physician-hospital contracting. Also, the current imbalance hampers the multidisciplinary approach to care and the collaboration required to provide patient-centred care.
The above findings indicate some directions to be further explored. First, future research needs to clarify in greater detail the interrelation between contractual and relational governance. Moreover, the impact of the contractual relationship and the associated incentives on the relational qualities and physicians' attitudes (like cooperation and trust) also requires further study. Second, a study of the processes of contracting could give more insight in the HPR. Third, the importance of the relational exchange between hospitals and physicians, and its effect on outcomes, is another important avenue for future research.
Conclusions
Our study found that physician-hospital contracting is complex. The contract is far more than a purely economic instrument for governing the financial aspects of the HPR. Specifically, the effects of the contract on the nature of the exchange -whether transactional or relational -need to be considered when determining the contract. Overall, while contractual governance methods are increasingly necessary to overcome the difficulties that arise from the fragmented payment framework in Belgium by aligning incentives and sharing financial risk between hospital and physician, they can at the same time undermine the necessary relational governance. Therefore, this indicates the need for a delicate balancing act. Trusting relationships and a focus on long-term cooperation are of major importance if effective HPRs are to be realized and to tackle the challenges faced by hospital care. It is important to avoid an HPR predominantly characterized by transactional exchanges and fostering an unhealthy us-and-them divide and mentality. A more integrated physician-hospital financial relationship could thus be very valuable.
Hospital financing is characterized by a dual split in payment between hospital and physician. Notwithstanding that physicians operate as selfemployed practitioners with a distinctive revenue stream, they need the organizational support that enables them to practice medicine. To cover these costs (reimbursed opaquely by medical fees) a negotiation takes place in each hospital between physicians and hospital representatives about the share of fees that should be transferred to the hospital. This share of financial means accounts for approximately 41% of the operating income of Belgian hospitals. The overarching method of physician cost settlement is regulated at the hospital level and applicable to all physicians practicing at that hospital. In general, two alternative principles of cost settlement exist: a physician contribution in terms of a percentage versus true cost coverage through a cost allocation scheme. 
